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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios report.[i] Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations. Trump’s May 2025 nuclear deal deadline would expire one month before the E3’s (Germany, France, and Italy) reported June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the reimposition of snapback sanctions.[ii] Prior negotiations, including the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have taken much longer and fell well short of the current US goals in negotiations. The JCPOA took 20 months to negotiate.[iii] White House National Security Adviser Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Iran must ”hand over and give up” all elements of its nuclear program.[iv]  Khamenei has also repeatedly explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States given the US‘ current ”maximum pressure” campaign.[v] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[vi] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations even as his top military commanders and hardliner allies advocate against negotiations.[vii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein also said that Israel had threatened to strike Iraq during an interview on March 17.[viii] Multiple US officials, including the secretaries of state and defense, may have discussed these warnings during recent conversations with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[ix]  These warnings come amid renewed US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and new Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias initially began their October 2023 to February 2024 attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip. Three militia-affiliated Iraqi sources told Qatari media on March 19 that multiple militias recently transferred weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night, in coordination with the Iraqi federal government, "in anticipation” of Israeli strikes.[x]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis. A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may assume unspecified activities due to “recent developments.”[xi] These “recent developments” could include US airstrikes targeting the Houthis or resumed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. These militias have previously attacked US forces in retaliation for real and perceived Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere in the region.[xii] The Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, includes some parties with armed wings in the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that consistently launched drone strikes that targeted Israel (from January to November 2024) and US forces (from October 2023 to January 2024).[xiii] The attacks targeting Israel sought to retaliate for Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.[xiv] The attacks targeting US forces likely sought to pressure the US to force the Israelis to end the war in the Gaza Strip while simultaneously encouraging a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly told PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders that Iran would support any militia reaction to an Israeli strike in Iraq during a visit to Baghdad on March 19, which could include targeting US forces.[xv]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.[xvi] CENTCOM struck al Hebshi Iron Factory, north of Hudaydah Port, twice in two days.[xvii] Local and regional media reported that CENTCOM also conducted airstrikes on the Houthi’s Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in Sanaa City, as well as several sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate.[xviii] Yemeni journalists also reported that US airstrikes in Al Jawf Governorate, northern Yemen, on March 16 killed three Houthi officials, including Commander Zain al Abidin al Mahtouri in al Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate. Mahtouri reportedly trained in Iran in 2020.[xix]

The Houthis launched an unspecified number of drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 18.[xx] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated that this is the fourth time the Houthis have attacked the aircraft carrier in 72 hours. CENTCOM published footage on March 19 showing the USS Harry S. Truman intercepting a Houthi one-way attack drone over an unspecified location in the Red Sea.[xxi]

US President Donald Trump warned Iran against sending supplies to the Houthis on March 19.[xxii] Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer told Iranian media that ”Iran does not interfere in our [Houthis] decision-making" and refuted reports from March 18 that Iran requested the Houthis to de-escalate tensions with the United States and Israel in the Red Sea.[xxiii] The Houthis are aligned with Iran and Iran is almost certainly still supplying them with weapons, but the Houthis sometimes act without direct Iranian approval.[xxiv]

Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities. Security forces dismantled an IED discovered near the Latakia-Jableh highway on March 19.[xxv] The IED, which appears to be a pipe with two fragmentation grenades, is a rudimentary device that the insurgents likely built to resemble garbage and escape notice. Security forces also located and dismantled a similarly produced IED near the same road on March 13.[xxvi] Both IEDs are rudimentary devices that are not particularly difficult to produce, but it is notable that insurgent cells in the area have nascent IED production capabilities. These capabilities could improve if insurgents are able to acquire more expertise, equipment, and materials. Miqdad al Fatiha, leader of Assadist insurgent group the Coastal Shield Brigade, vowed in a March 13 video statement that his fighters would plant IEDs on roads in the next phase of fighting against government forces.[xxvii]

Syrian media reported that insurgents targeted several vehicles with Molotov cocktails in Jableh, Latakia Province, on March 19.[xxviii] The insurgents then attacked a gas station in the area before security forces arrived.[xxix] Insurgents’ targeting of possible civilian vehicles or civilian infrastructure may seek to generate fear in local communities and reduce a community’s faith in government forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: President Donald Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal, according to an Axios Iran is very unlikely to agree to a new deal on a two-month timetable given its current policies on negotiations.
• Israel and Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq after the United States reportedly repeatedly warned the Iraqi government to prevent attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could target Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
• US Air Campaign in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi industrial and administrative sites across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since CTP-ISW's cutoff on March 18.
• Insurgency in Syria: Certain insurgent cells in Latakia Province have demonstrated limited improvised explosive device (IED) production capabilities.

Syria

Syrian media reported that unknown gunmen killed a man accused of collaborating with the Assad regime in Aleppo City on March 19.[xxx] Syrian media outlets and analysts posted differing accounts of Naasani’s killing. An Aleppo-based outlet reported that unknown gunmen on a motorcycle killed Naasani.[xxxi] Another Syrian analyst reported that the gunmen shot Naasani in his office in Azamiyah District, however.[xxxii] The identity of the attackers remain unclear, but revenge-motivated killings of former Assad regime officials and supporters have continued to take place in Syrian provinces outside of the coastal region in recent weeks.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) met with a Syrian interim government delegation to discuss the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state on March 19 at al Shaddadi base, Hasakah Province.[xxxiii] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi headed the SDF delegation, which included a member of the Women‘s Protection Units (YPJ) General Command.[xxxiv] Former Deir ez Zor Province Governor Hussein Salama led a five-member government delegation that Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara recently appointed to negotiate with the SDF.[xxxv]  Syrian media reported that US representatives also attended the discussions.[xxxvi] The US military has mediated between certain opposition groups and the Syrian government in recent months, according to the Wall Street Journal.[xxxvii]

The SDF announced that the delegations agreed that working committees to address the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)’s economic, political, and military integration into the interim government will start work at the beginning of April.[xxxviii] Syrian media called the meeting’s atmosphere ”positive,” but several outstanding issues between the parties remain, including discussions over the Constitutional Declaration and a possible ceasefire on the frontlines in northeastern Syria.[xxxix] The AANES recently publicly rejected the Constitutional Declaration for obstructing a democratic transition and prioritizing Arab identity.[xl]

Syrian Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat at Hijri issued a detailed rebuke of the interim government’s rule and decision-making since taking power on March 18.[xli] Hijri has repeatedly condemned the interim government’s decisions since December 2024 while remaining open to working with Damascus.[xlii] Hirji’s comments on March 18 similarly expressed his openness to ”cooperation” to correct the country’s ”path.”[xliii] Hijri issued several action items for the interim government including re-writing the interim constitution, limiting presidential powers, and permitting greater independence at the provincial level.[xliv] Druze opinion remains deeply divided on how to deal with the interim government and Hijri does not have the ultimate say in Suwayda’s relationship with Damascus.[xlv]  Prominent Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, Mudafa al Karama, and Ahrar Jabal al Arab Gathering, agreed with the interim Syrian Interior Ministry on March 6 to establish locally led provincial security forces under interim Syrian government control.[xlvi] The interim government opened recruitment centers in Suwayda on March 12.[xlvii]

The Syrian interim government is likely messaging that it can provide security and seeks to prevent sectarian conflict by spreading details of failed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacks in January 2025.[xlviii] The Syrian interim Interior Ministry distributed a video featuring interviews with ISIS fighters describing the organization’s attempted attack on prominent Shia religious site Sayyidah Zeinab shrine and a Christian church in Rif Dimashq Province.[xlix] The ISIS fighters said that their goal was to ignite ”sectarian strife” in Syria through attacks on minorities.[l] CTP-ISW assesses that ISIS will continue to attempt to trigger sectarian violence in Syria. The interim government is refuting Assadist and Iranian accusations that the interim government is conducting sectarian-motivated killings by publicizing their efforts to stop sectarian attacks.[li] Damascus will need to take concrete action and ensure a fair legal process, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities, however. This includes concrete action against the government’s allies who commit acts of sectarian violence. Such prosecutions would enable the interim government to restore trust among Syrians, particularly Alawites, and could undercut any insurgent recruitment efforts.

Syrian forces seized weapons after expelling Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers from Hawsh al Sayyid Ali, Homs Province, on March 18.[lii] Hawsh al Sayyid Ali is reportedly a "central hub" for Hezbollah smuggling operations, and videos posted on X (Twitter) showed that Hezbollah-linked smugglers ran an operations center in the town to facilitate smuggling operations.[liii] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to Hawsh al Sayyid Ali in coordination with Syrian forces.[liv] The LAF conducted patrols and closed several illegal border crossings in the Qusayr area between Syria and Lebanon.[lv] Hezbollah-linked smugglers shelled Syrian villages north of Hawsh al Sayyid Ali on March 18.[lvi]

Syrian Public Security Forces intercepted a shipment of weapons from Iran to Lebanese Hezbollah at an unspecified location on the Syria-Lebanon border on March 19.[lvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border.[lviii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force continued to strike military infrastructure inside Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 18. A southern-Syria-based journalist reported on March 18 that an Israeli drone struck a Syrian military position in al Kawm, Quneitra Province.[lix] The IDF Air Force separately struck a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defense base in Shinshar, Homs Province, on March 18.[lx] Homs Province is outside the IDF-declared ”demilitarized” zone in southern Syria.[lxi]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Shia Basrawi demonstrators gathered at the Turkish consulate in Basra on March 18 to protest “Turkish-Zionist” aggression against Alawites and Shiites in Syria.[lxii] Protest representative Sheikh Mujtaba al Mansouri called on Iraqi Sunni scholars to issue an official position on the “takfiri gangs," which is a reference to the interim government forces in Syria.  Mansouri is a member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[lxiii] Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups use the term ”takfiri” to refer to armed Sunni organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda. Iran and its partners frequently apply the same label to other Sunni Islamist organizations, including the leaders of the Syrian government.[lxiv] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have described the fall of the Assad regime as a “Turkish conspiracy” and Iranian media has accused Turkey of condoning the killing of Alawites in Syria.[lxv]

Preparations for the October 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections remain on track, despite Victory Coalition head Haider al Abadi’s claim that Iraqi parliamentary elections will be delayed to December 2025. Abadi provided no evidence for his assertion.[lxvi] An official from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which is the Iraqi electoral commission, told Iraqi media on March 19 that preparations for the October elections remain on track.[lxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.  

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 976,600 rials to one US dollar on March 18 to 977,800 rials to one US dollar on March 19.[lxviii]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.