Is This Game Over for the Houthis?

While the fighting power and military arsenal of other Iran-backed proxies in the so-called axis of resistance, Hamas and Hezbollah, have been eroded significantly since the attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Houthi movement has survived relatively unscathed. Since the cease-fire and hostage deal was announced between Israel and Hamas in January, the Houthis have been on standby as the de facto enforcers of the agreement, retaining the leverage to resume violence at a time of their own choosing. On March 11, the Houthis announced that the group will resume its attacks in the Red Sea as a response to Israel blocking humanitarian aid entering Gaza. This balance of asymmetrical power is what the United States seems to be targeting in a series of intense airstrikes that could extend into the coming weeks.

The shift in U.S. policy under the Trump administration, from targeted strikes to a broader, more aggressive campaign, marks a significant escalation. This change reflects a hardening stance against the Houthis, moving beyond containment to active disruption of their capabilities. The decision to target political leadership alongside military assets suggests a desire to dismantle the Houthis’ organizational structure, not just degrade the immediate military threat they pose.

What can U.S. strikes accomplish?

In early March, the U.S. State Department re-designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, imposing sanctions on key financial operatives, including Mohammed Abdulsalam, the Houthi spokesperson and chief negotiator. Abdulsalam, who controls an oil conglomerate and once monopolized oil imports into northern Yemen according to our Yemen-based sources, had been engaged in a period of sustained talks that began in end April 2022 with the Saudis inside Oman. Open-source reporting acknowledges that talks began in October.

By conducting the strikes, the United States is supporting the interests of regional allies that are in trouble stemming from persistent Houthi armed politics and warmongering in Yemen and across its borders. Where the Houthi disruption in the Red Sea has hit the hardest is Egypt, which has lost up to $7 billion in revenues through the Suez Canal as vessels avoided Houthi attacks in 2024. The United Arab Emirates has military, commercial, and economic interests in the Red Sea region. Saudi Arabia has been stuck in a yearslong, stalling diplomatic process with no end in sight.

During the course of the first phase of the cease-fire in Gaza, the Houthis stuck to their word not to attack Israeli-flagged or other commercial vessels in the Red Sea. But the collapsing cease-fire deal is remobilizing the Houthis to target Israel directly, which they have done in the past through drones and ballistic missiles, although almost all have been intercepted. U.S. strikes aiming to incapacitate the group’s senior leaders and erode its military infrastructure will attempt to prevent the Houthis from taking retaliatory action.

Second, diverting their attention away from kinetic activity in the coastal waters freed up the Houthis to threaten their political opponents in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council. The prospect of a Houthi-controlled Yemen is a risk to U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East as it would gift Iran access to the country’s coveted coastal region, the strategic Hodeidah seaport, and its border with Saudi Arabia, potentially using Yemen as a launching pad for regional instability.

Are the Houthis the next Hezbollah?

The complicating factor is that the Houthis are far more than a group of thugs or ragtag army of bandits. Instead, acting as a rebel governance movement, the Houthis command a war economy that allows them to profit from illegal smuggling of commodities that range from fuel to cigarettes, while extracting tax revenues and stamp duties as a de facto state-like entity in Sanaa and northern Yemen, where it claims political authority. A sustained U.S. military campaign may degrade the grip that the Houthis hold over Yemen’s seaports and smuggling networks that allow them to trade in illegal goods, procure dual-use components, and secure their resilience.

In recent years, high-level Hezbollah and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials have been known to support the Houthis with technical training and intelligence-sharing. Following the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December, our research has tracked an upward trend in the movement of former Lebanon- and Syria-based Hezbollah commanders and fighters, as well as Shiite militia from Iraq, to Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

In our assessment, cross-border activity across the Lebanon-Syria-Iraq axis toward Yemen is part of a trend of remobilization and realignment as Hezbollah and Hamas are strategically downgraded. The Houthis have a presence in Iraq, with a bureau in Baghdad and smaller offices in Kirkuk and southern Iraq. While difficult to confirm, some confidential sources inside Iraq have told us that Houthi fighters use a training camp in the town of Khalis, Diyala in an area controlled by Kata’ib Hezbollah. Our interviews suggest that some military personnel within the Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular Mobilization Forces (the Iran-backed Shiite paramilitary structure), have been deployed over the past three to four months to Yemen to train local fighters in emerging combat technologies, armed drone deployment, and improvised explosive device attacks. The cross-pollination of axis groups improves the Houthis’ military capabilities and operational tactics and has empowered them to continue to leverage a credible threat against maritime shipping lanes.

The balance of power along the Iranian axis has been shifting to the Houthis in Yemen, which have emerged as the most well-equipped and financed non-state armed group aligned with Iran in the new security landscape following the decline of Hezbollah’s defensive and offensive capabilities. Outside of direct Iranian influence, the Houthis have also been opportunistically engaging with al-Shabaab, the Somali affiliate of al Qaeda, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. That the U.S. strikes come now, and with such intensity, is testament to this coalescing of armed actors across the region.

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Retreat, recover, or resolve?

While Hezbollah has retreated to rebuild its military capabilities, the Houthis have shown resolve to step up, issuing ultimatums to Israel and acting brazenly to consolidate their domestic grip on power. The Houthis see themselves as playing the role that Hezbollah once played. At the same time, the Houthis have increased their footprint in Iraq, with their members being embedded with Shiite Iraqi militias. The Houthis have also moved some of their operations from Yemen to Iraq and have created, as well as plugged into existing, shell companies to benefit from the Iraqi financial system that operates at the behest of Iranian interests.

Iran has helped the Houthis in proliferating drones and ballistic missiles. Tehran views the group as a valuable ally and will not shy from directing the IRGC’s efforts to bolster the Houthis’ capabilities even as Iran is under pressure domestically after expenditures in the billions of dollars to prop up Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime. In the short term, the Houthis are gaining some recognition and can sustain if they are not facing strong military pressure—something that can change under the Trump administration.

It is unclear how far the Trump administration is willing to go in its current military campaign. While the Houthi attacks are focused on the maritime routes, the problem is essentially a land problem. The Houthi control along the west coast of Yemen is what makes the attacks more decisive and highly disruptive. Most observers agree that a ground operation by U.S. forces is very unlikely, which means there is a clear limitation to how much the U.S. can achieve through military means alone. The Houthis’ control of a large part of Yemen and the mountainous landscape makes them able to absorb an aerial campaign.

However, if these attacks continue with the same pace for a sustained period, this will motivate the Houthi opponents to start capitalizing on the Houthis’ losses and their inability to move forces freely between the different front lines. The conflict in Yemen is at a stalemate, but the Houthis haven’t signed any agreement with their local rivals. Also, local grievances in the last two years have surfaced, which the Houthis have managed to suppress with extreme force. The economic pressure the Houthis are facing will also make it hard to mobilize fighters and finance a new round of conflict. The Houthis realize they are currently at a disadvantage but are counting on the United States losing interest over the course of a protracted military campaign. In other words, America’s own limitation is what the Houthis will count on to avoid a collapse similar to the Assad regime and Hezbollah.