Republika Srpska: the Next Potential Flashpoint in Europe
Introduction
Decades of unresolved political disputes in the Balkans have created opportunities for Russia to attack the legitimacy of Western influence in the region. These opportunities have been exploited by pro-Russian actors who have promoted the restoration of a pan-Slavic civilization from the Balkans to Eastern Europe. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 catalyzed efforts by revisionists to turn these dreams into reality. Since then, groups, either inspired or directly supported by Russia, have attempted numerous covert actions to destabilize the Balkans.[i] The risk of conflict is quietly growing again in the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serbian federal republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is a potential flashpoint for future conflict between the carefully cultivated regional security architecture formulated by the West and revisionists supported by Russia.
Republika Srpska’s leader, Milorad Dodik, has intensified his often-bombastic threats to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina, with substantive attacks on the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dodik’s brinkmanship since 2023 is pushing his polity toward a confrontation with the international peacekeeping mission which has held the fragile peace in the Balkans together.[ii] This showdown could inadvertently precipitate a major conflict, as an array of powerful allies from Russia and Serbia, each with some interest in revising the regional order, line up behind Dodik.
This essay discusses the long and complex origins of this slow-moving crisis. It recounts the extensive historic interests Russia holds within the Balkans and how Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska emerged as a special outpost for Russian influence. It details the current support Russia and Russian aligned non-state actors have provided separatists in Republika Srpska. It proposes that this support has intensified amid heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Western Europe and in turn contributed to more brazen behavior by pro-Russian revisionists. This essay then concludes with a warning that political rifts in the European Union combined with an inadequately sized peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina is eroding the deterrence needed to keep regional separatism in check. A miscalculation by separatists could escalate in ways that are difficult to control and lead to war. An increasingly resentful and militarized Kremlin might welcome and even encourage such a war to weaken and divide Western Europe.
Historical Origins of Russian Backed-Separatism in the Balkans
Russian interest in the Balkans stems from a combination of geopolitical considerations as well as religious and cultural affinities dating back to the Tsarist era. Located between the water ways connecting the breadbasket of Eastern Europe with the markets of Africa and Asia, the Balkans lay along one of the most important global trade routes for agricultural commodities.[iii] Today nearly 20% of the world’s cereal crops, including 30% of global wheat exports, pass through the Turkish straits which delineate the southeastern boundary of the region.[iv]
The geography of the Balkans has made it a historical converging point of empires, but its mountainous terrain has made it difficult for potential hegemons to establish enduring control of local populations. Great empires from Western and Eastern Europe and the Islamic world have all periodically washed over the region like flood tides. Each empire has left behind pockets of ethnic, religious, cultural, and political influence. This complex mosaic of peoples in the Balkans, while a wellspring of great cultural diversity and achievement, is also a source of significant obstacles to permanent regional unity. Foreign powers have utilized these cultural cleavages to their own claims to regional influence.
Instability in another corner of Europe may be appealing to Russian leaders.
Russia has been one of the most vociferous stakeholders in the Balkans since the 19th Century pan-Slavic movement. That movement promoted the reunification of ethnic Slavs and Orthodox Christians left behind in the region in the wake of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires with their kinfolk in Eastern Europe under the Russian Empire.[v] Pan-Slavism appealed to Russian nationalists interested in acquiring Constantinople to shore up Russia’s claims to the inheritance of the Roman empire.[vi] It also appealed to Orthodox communities in the Balkans seeking an alternative to dominance by Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey.[vii]
Russia’s appeal as a preferred patron continues in the region today, particularly among ethnic Serbs. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbia has emerged as a key Russian partner in the Balkans. Serbia received considerable sympathy, in addition to moral and material support from Russia amid the Balkan wars of the 1990’s.[viii] Putin and other Russian leaders continue to cultivate these sympathies, portraying Serbia as an early victim of post-Cold War Western triumphalism just like Russia.[ix]
The disappointing results of democratization and anxiety over the erosion of traditional values by liberalism, combined with the perceptions of overreach by Western powers have created lasting resentments among Serbs.[x] The NATO backed secession of Kosovo, the birthplace of Serbia’s most powerful national myth, convinced many Serbs of the illegitimacy of the region’s borders, and the need for Russia as a patron and protector. The need is felt particularly intensely among ethnic Serbs who feel insecure as ethnic minorities in other nations. A 2024 survey by the International Republican Institute found that 94% of Bosnian Serbs reported a positive view of Russia.[xi]
Insecurity and resentment have provided opportunities for radical politicians, influence entrepreneurs, and criminal organizations from Russia and Serbia to offer an alternative vision of regional order for the Balkans.[xii] These groups have on multiple occasions attempted to achieve their reordering of the Balkans through force, with failed coup attempts in Montenegro in 2016 and Moldova in 2023, aborted uprisings in Northern Kosovo, and attempted assassinations elsewhere.[xiii] Evolving conditions in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska suggest that the Serb enclave may be the next target of a violent test of the regional order.
Republika Srpska as a Strategic Frontier for Russia
On November 20, 2023, NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenburg warned that separatist activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic Serb region of Republika Srpska appeared to be encouraged by Moscow.[xiv] Months earlier, in June 2023, Milorad Dodik passed new laws rejecting the legitimacy of Bosnian law in the federal republic.[xv] These laws appeared to set conditions for de facto independence for Republika Srpska, a violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement which could reignite civil war.[xvi] Dodik was indicted for this breach of the Dayton Accords on August 24, 2023.[xvii] Dodik responded to this indictment by stirring protests along the ethnic boundaries of the Republika Srpska and threatening to arrest the Bosnian High Representative Christian Schmidt.[xviii] After several delays Milorad Dodik was officially put on trial in February 2024. Legal proceedings against Dodik are ongoing, with a verdict expected in 2025.[xix]
Putin’s repeated platforming of grievances about the West’s scuttling of the Dayton Accords bears eerie resemblance to similar litanies of complaints Putin levied against the Minsk Agreements before the start of the 2022 war.
Dodik’s surge of separatist agitating has coincided with Russia’s war in Ukraine, which he has openly supported. Some experts believe that Dodik has utilized the war to tap anti-Western sentiment among Serbs in the region, who might see parallels between Russia’s war in Ukraine and Serbia’s own wars in the 1990s, to chip away at the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government of Bosnia.[xx] The gambit appears to have worked. Dodik’s popularity has been bolstered by his legal conflict with the Bosnian government and its Western supporters, resulting in significant electoral gains for his Alliance of Independent Social Democrats in 2024.[xxi] The surge in popular support makes holding Milorad Dodik accountable for violating the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement more fraught with the potential for conflict. Failure to defend the Dayton Peace Agreement from systemic violations also carries the risk of provoking a broader disintegration of the complex federal system constructed to maintain peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 1990s.
The volatile situation fostered by Dodik has provided an opening for pro-Russian actors to resurrect a pan-Slavic vision for the region. Bosnia may be more vulnerable to the violent power plays which Russian supported groups attempted unsuccessfully in Montenegro in 2016 and Moldova in 2023. This vulnerability stems from a formidable network of support Dodik has cultivated from the Russian state, along with regional influence entrepreneurs, the Orthodox Church, and a number of paramilitary and criminal organizations from Russia and Serbia such as the Night Wolves and Serbian Honor.[xxii]
State Support for Separatist Activity in Republika Srpska
Milorad Dodik enjoys support at the highest echelons of the Russian and Serbian states, maintaining close relationships with the presidents and other top leaders of both countries. This support for Dodik as a regional leader has not historically translated into broad acceptance of independence for Republika Srpska, which would risk reigniting a regional war. Russia’s ongoing confrontation with the West, spurred by its 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine, may be changing the prevailing calculus, creating powerful incentives to provoke conflict.
Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić has been circumspect about independence for Republika Srpska. Vučić has repeatedly emphasized regional stability when confronted with questions of independence for Republika Srpska. Vučić underlined his preference for regional stability in a November 2024 interview with the BBC, stating, “Serbia’s stance has always been consistent—we respect Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity as per international law, the UN Charter, and relevant resolutions.”[xxiii] Peace through a pragmatic balancing of relations between Russia and the European Union has been a cornerstone of Serbian foreign policy under Vučić.[xxiv] This has been exemplified by Serbia’s abstention from sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, happening simultaneously with its quiet cooperation with European nations to provide military assistance to Ukraine.[xxv]
Aleksandar Vučić’s delicate balancing of Serbia’s international relations reflects the divergent interests of his domestic political constituencies. These groups include Serbs interested in greater ties with Europe and Serbian nationalists who prefer partnership with Russia. A balance of interests, both domestically and internationally may be difficult to maintain indefinitely. Ideological proponents of revanchist ideas of a Greater Serbia incorporating Republika Srpska have gained political power since the Serbian elections of 2023.
In April 2024 a newly elected Serbian government appointed Aleksandar Vulin, the former director of Serbia’s intelligence service, as Deputy Prime Minister.[xxvi] The appointment of Vulin has sparked concern among international observers in the West, over his affinity for Russia, and his previous calls to form a united “Serb World.”[xxvii] Vulin’s ascension has elevated the issue of Republika Srpska as a Serbian foreign policy priority. Prior to being appointed Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Vulin was given a seat on the Senate of Republika Srpska by Milorad Dodik.[xxviii] Vulin has shown support for separatist activity in his official capacity by attending Republika Srpska Day festivities, banned under the Dayton Peace Agreement, in Banja Luka in January 2025.[xxix]
Vulin’s formal political power, and ties to informal criminal networks, provides additional opportunities for Milorad Dodik to obtain money and arms through both Russia and Serbia. Vulin is known to have previously used his official positions to help facilitate illegal transnational shipments of arms, making him the subject of U.S. sanctions.[xxx] It has also been alleged by both Serbian and Ukrainian civil society groups that Vulin assisted the Wagner Group’s efforts to recruit Serbian citizens to fight in Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2022.[xxxi]
Vulin’s affinity for Russia has the potential to unbalance Vučić’s carefully calibrated balancing act which has helped maintain regional stability amid Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine. Since becoming Deputy Prime Minister, Vulin has repeatedly traveled to Russia to meet senior Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin.[xxxii] Putin used a September 2024 meeting in Vladivostok to prod Vulin for an update on the status of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which Vulin then suggested was threatened by unspecified legal revisions by the West.[xxxiii] The remarks mirrored complaints made by Milorad Dodik during a meeting with Putin in St. Petersburg in June 2024, less than a year after Dodik withdrew Republika Srpska from the jurisdiction of the Bosnian Constitutional Court.[xxxiv]
Under Putin, Russia has utilized support for Republika Srpska as a means of retaining influence in Serbia, and of preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s full integration into European institutions.[xxxv] Putin’s interest in preserving stability in the region may be changing as he eyes new and more aggressive means of applying pressure on the West as the war in Ukraine drags on into its third year. Putin’s repeated platforming of grievances about the West’s scuttling of the Dayton Accords bears eerie resemblance to similar litanies of complaints Putin levied against the Minsk Agreements before the start of the 2022 war.[xxxvi] Putin’s use of Aleksandar Vulin to allege that the Dayton Peace Agreement was being undermined by Western duplicity, mimicked a similar public denouncement Putin extracted from his Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak regarding the Minsk Agreements two days before the start of the full scale invasion.[xxxvii]
Non-State Networks Supporting Separatism in Republika Srpska
Unlike with Ukraine, Russia does not share a border with either Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. That geographical distance, combined with the presence of Western troops significantly reduces Russia’s ability to reshape regional borders through direct military intervention. Any attempts to dramatically alter the region would likely be facilitated through non-state networks running through Serbia.
One of Milorad Dodik’s key allies in Moscow outside of government is Konstantin Malofeev.[xxxviii] An ultra-religious Russian oligarch and culture warrior, Malofeev has been variously called “Putin’s Soros,” and “God’s Oligarch.”[xxxix] Malofeev’s star among the Russian elite has risen since the start of the war in Ukraine, culminating in his September 2024 marriage to Putin ally, Maria Lvova-Belova, the architect of Russia’s deportation and adoption program for Ukrainian children, due in part to his zealous commitment to Russian victory.[xl] Malofeev has used his wealth and business acumen to supply Russian militias, such as the Union of Donbas Volunteers; and wage an information war through a network of media organizations such as Tsargrad TV, charities including the Saint Basil the Great Foundation, and think tanks like Katehon.[xli]
The group’s fighters act as “spare people” to exhaust Ukrainian defenses to create opportunities for more specialized Russian military forces to exploit.
Years before the war in Ukraine, Malofeev honed his network of hard and soft power by pursuing his own geopolitical goals in the Balkans. Malofeev is known to have been involved in several major plots to destabilize the Balkans in the intervening years between Russia’s initial seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Malofeev has been implicated in both the attempted assassination of Bulgarian industrialist Emilian Gebrev in 2015 and the attempted overthrow of the Montenegrin government in 2016. Both plots involved coordination with Russian military intelligence officers from GRU Unit 29155 with the latter coup attempt a joint operation with Serbian militants.[xlii]
It is unclear whether Malofeev has conducted these attempts to destabilize the Balkans at the behest of Vladimir Putin or has generally acted on his own initiative with some support from other influential power brokers. The latter scenario seems more likely due to Malofeev’s pan-Slavic advocacy, and deep resources to fund his own influence operations.[xliii] Dodik is one of the close relationships Malofeev has cultivated with pro-Russian and pro-Serbian political and civic leaders in the Balkans. Dodik’s connection with Malofeev links a constellation of paramilitary and criminal organizations which may be used to challenge the existing order in the Balkans.
Malofeev is a longtime supporter of The Night Wolves outlaw motorcycle gang.[xliv] The Night Wolves, founded by Alexander Zaldostanov of Russia and Sasa Savic of Serbia, has a significant presence in the Balkans. The group is known to have received funding from the Russian government and has fostered a cordial working relationship with Vladimir Putin who has taken part in at least one bike ride with the group.[xlv] The group played a small but important role supporting the invasion and annexation of Crimea by serving as a screening force to disrupt a Ukrainian response into the peninsula.[xlvi]
The Night Wolves have expressed interest in fomenting pro-Serbian violence and separatism in the Balkans. A December 2022 post on the Night Wolves Vkontake account emphasized the intertwined fates of Slavic people in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia with the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[xlvii] In 2023 the Night Wolves members became a visible and menacing presence at rallies for Milorad Dodik.[xlviii] The Night Wolves are one of a broader coalition of paramilitary groups linking Malofeev and Dodik.
Malofeev has cultivated his own client paramilitary organization, the Union of Donbas Volunteers.[xlix] The group is a composite force of thousands of militia fighters led by Russian Duma Member Alexander Borodai which has fought in Ukraine since 2015.[l] A 2023 reorganization effectively integrated the Union of Donbas Volunteers with Russian GRU military intelligence.[li] According to Borodai, the group’s fighters act as “spare people” to exhaust Ukrainian defenses to create opportunities for more specialized Russian military forces to exploit.[lii]
The Union of Donbas Volunteers has served as a holding company for not only fighters employed by Malofeev but also for Serbian paramilitaries who have dedicated themselves to liberating Republika Srpska.[liii] These include Serbian Action and Serbian Honor. Serbian Action is a violent far-right extremist group dedicated to expelling liberal Western influences from Serbia and preserving the spiritual and racial purity of the Serbian people.[liv] Serbian Action maintains close ties with other violent far-right groups throughout Europe, including the Russian Imperial Movement, a U.S. designated global terrorist organization.[lv] Serbian Honor is a paramilitary group that is alleged to have been founded by Milorad Dodik.[lvi] The group is led by Bosnian Serb Bojan Stojković and Serbian national Igor Bilbija and draws its members heavily from criminal organizations.[lvii] Reports indicate that members of Serbian Honor have received military training in Russia and gained combat experience fighting alongside Russian backed forces in Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion.[lviii]
Serbian Honor operates with a humanitarian relief organization, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre, in the Serbian city of Niš.[lix] The center was founded in 2012 and has been run in part by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.[lx] The center was planned during Sergei Shoigu’s long tenure as Minister of Emergency Situations, and founded just prior to his taking office as Minister of Defense.[lxi] Some experts have suggested that the center has served as a base for Russian intelligence operations.[lxii]
A Window of Opportunity for the Revisionists
Milorad Dodik has become more aggressive in asserting separatist ambitions for the region since 2023. Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine has shattered assumptions about the stability of Europe and provided an ongoing example of the continued utility of military force to change borders. Wavering commitments to the defense of Ukraine by the West may also be emboldening Dodik to test the resolve of the international mission to Bosnia. Economic and diplomatic lifelines thrown to Dodik from Viktor Orban’s Hungary highlight cracks within the European Union’s vision for Balkan integration.[lxiii]
Peripheral instability and political disunity in Europe erode the credibility of the international mission which keeps the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is especially troubling as the deterrent effect of European Union Forces (EUFOR) in the region depends on their credibility as disciplined fighting units, backed by nations committed to pursuing decisive military victory if necessary. With only a single multinational battalion of approximately 1,000 troops deployed, EUFOR is now only a small fraction of the 7,000 deployed two decades earlier.[lxiv] Perceptions of weakness in the European Union’s commitment to security in Bosnia may embolden Dodik to press for even greater independence for Republika Srpska under the assumption that it lacks the wherewithal to take aggressive action to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dodik may already be testing such an approach with changes of laws, threats of arrest of the Bosnian High Representative, and refusals to recognize the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court.
History provides good reasons for leaders in Russia, Serbia, and Republika Srpska to be skeptical of the commitment of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission did little to combat the most brazen acts of aggression during the Bosnian War. Serb forces completely disregarded the UN’s commitment to enforce safe areas during the war and routinely slaughtered Bosniak Muslims while UN peacekeepers looked on.[lxv] The worst of these depredations was in Republika Srpska itself, in the city of Srebrenica in 1995, where Serb forces massacred over 8,000 Bosniak civilians, who were under the protection of a force of 400 Dutch peacekeepers.[lxvi] The brazenness of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine, including the abduction of thousands of children, attacks on Ukraine’s grain exports, and casual threats of nuclear attack, have once again undermined the image of the UN and of peacekeeping more broadly.[lxvii]
It is not clear that Dodik actually intends to go to war over his separatist threats. Some experts including Zlatko Miletic, the former chief of Bosnia’s federal police, have suggested that Dodik’s aim is primarily self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment.[lxviii] However, Dodik’s brinkmanship could develop a momentum of its own and inadvertently precipitate a conflict. The consistent attacks on the legitimacy of the UN mission to Bosnia risk inflaming popular passions. A resulting crisis would incentivize ambitious influence entrepreneurs such as Russia’s Konstantin Malofeev and politicians like Serbia’s Aleksandar Vulin to probe for opportunities to advance their own interests.
A provocation designed for political effect could escalate in ways that are difficult to anticipate. Paramilitary groups like Serbian Honor could thrust themselves into action after misreading the political situation. This is what happened in September 2023, when a dispute over vehicle license plates in Northern Kosovo led to a gun battle between Kosovo police and Serb nationalists led by exiled Serb Kosovar leader Milan Radoicic.[lxix] The ensuing firefight between the two groups killed four people and resulted in a siege of a Serbian Orthodox monastery where the gunmen took shelter.[lxx]
The single battalion of EUFOR troops deployed to the region would face off against as many as 6,000 official “gendarmeries” employed by the government of Republika Srpska, and the potentially thousands of other unofficial paramilitary forces which would likely rally to its support.
A similar confrontation in Republika Srpska could scale quickly as Russian influence entrepreneurs, notably Konstantin Malofeev, could surge the provision of additional arms, men, and materials to prop up Dodik. Malofeev’s Union of Donbas Volunteers is already integrated into the Russian military intelligence apparatus and could be effectively supported and directed by Russian advisors already on the ground such as at the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center.
A fight, once initiated, could develop a momentum of its own, and override the ability of the region’s leaders to control. Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, would come under enormous pressure, even from members of his own party, to support fellow Serbs in a fight should one be instigated. Furthermore, Russia could amplify support for the war with disinformation on supposed atrocities committed by Bosnian and Western forces. This is a tactic it employed with some success in mobilizing pro-Russian forces in the hybrid war for the Ukrainian Donbas region in 2014 and 2015.[lxxi] The popularity of Russian state media such as RT and Sputnik, agitprop outlets such as Konstantin Malofeev’s Tsargrad TV, and political alignment between the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches could create a formidable echo chamber of voices demanding war.[lxxii]
Conclusion
What is most concerning about the slow-motion crisis in Republika Srpska, is that separatists have a plausible basis for assuming secession can succeed. Republika Srpska is already an autonomous political entity, and Milorad Dodik’s recent attempts to separate the region from the legal institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina have lowered obstacles to true independence. Azerbaijan’s rapid seizure of Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023 also provides a recent supporting case that minor powers can resolve intractable territorial disputes through military force, even in the face of international peacekeepers.[lxxiii] Dodik has spoken admiringly of Azerbaijan’s success and signaled that he had taken inspiration from it, stating, “I am closely following happenings referring the situation in the region of Karabakh and want to say that settlement of the decades-long disputes, like in history of many other nations and states around the world, called for the courage and wisdom of a strong and wise leader.”[lxxiv]
If Dodik’s believes he is the strong and wise leader called to wage a full-fledged rebellion against the international mission to Bosnia, he will begin from a strategically advantageous position. In the event of war, the separatists in Republika Srpska will defend territory they already control. As a result, forcing the breakaway republic back into line will require an offensive military operation by international peacekeeping forces and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The force needed to decisively beat any such insurrection may be beyond the capacity of the existing force on the ground. The single battalion of EUFOR troops deployed to the region would face off against as many as 6,000 official “gendarmeries” employed by the government of Republika Srpska, and the potentially thousands of other unofficial paramilitary forces which would likely rally to its support.[lxxv]
The credibility of the deterrence provided by this limited peacekeeping force is further undermined by divisions within the European Union. Hungary’s Viktor Orban is a friend of Milorad Dodik and proud recipient of the “Order of Republika Srpska.”[lxxvi] Objections by Orban could present significant obstacles to rallying a robust mission to defeat a rebellion. Orban could use Hungary’s EU voting power to obfuscate a EUFOR response. Orban would likely grow more obstinately opposed to such a response the longer and bloodier the conflict becomes, as his record toward military support to Ukraine has recently demonstrated.[lxxvii]
Even if successful, a military campaign and counterinsurgency might be sufficiently costly to leave lasting instability in the region. Instability in another corner of Europe may be appealing to Russian leaders. A new security dilemma for Europe to cope with, one which saps resources and attention and stymies further European integration, would be seen by many in Moscow as just desserts for Europe over its support for Ukraine.
[i] Anna Caprile and Branislav Stanicek, “Russia and the Western Balkans: Geopolitical Confrontation, Economic Influence and Political Interference | Think Tank | European Parliament,” Briefing (European Parliamentary Research Service: European Parliament, April 18, 2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)747096.
[ii] Stefano Fella, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Secessionism in the Republika Srpska” (UK Parliament, April 29, 2024), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10013/.
[iii] Rob Bailey and Laura Wellesley, “Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade,” Chatham House Report (Chatham House, May 16, 2023), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/06/chokepoints-and-vulnerabilities-global-food-trade.
[iv] Ramon Key et al., “Potential Climate-Induced Impacts on Trade: The Case of Agricultural Commodities and Maritime Chokepoints,” Journal of Shipping and Trade 9, no. 1 (April 23, 2024): 11, https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-024-00170-3.
[v] Louis Levine, “Pan-Slavism and European Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 29, no. 4 (December 1, 1914): 664–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2142012.
[vi] Levine.
[vii] Levine.
[viii] James McBride, “Russia’s Influence in the Balkans,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 21, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans.
[ix] James McBride.
[x] Harun Karčić and Peter Mandaville, “Dislodging Putin’s Foothold in the Balkans,” United States Institute of Peace, June 1, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/dislodging-putins-foothold-balkans.
[xi] Dimitar Bechev, “Between the EU and Moscow: How Russia Exploits Divisions in Bosnia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 27, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/bosnia-between-russia-eu?lang=en; “Western Balkans Regional Poll | February –March 2024 | Full-Deck,” International Republican Institute, May 14, 2024, https://www.iri.org/resources/western-balkans-regional-poll-february-march-2024-full/.
[xii] James McBride, “Russia’s Influence in the Balkans.”
[xiii] Dusica Tomovic Pantovic Maja Zivanovic, Milivoje, “Bratislav Dikic: Alleged Mastermind of Montenegro’s ‘Coup,’” Balkan Insight, October 21, 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/10/21/bratislav-dikic-alleged-mastermind-of-montenegro-s-coup-10-20-2016/.
[xiv] “NATO Secretary General Underscores Importance of Stability in the Western Balkans at the Start of His Visit to the Region,” NATO, November 20, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220279.htm.
[xv] “Sud BiH potvrdio optužnicu protiv Milorada Dodika,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, September 11, 2023, sec. Bosna i Hercegovina, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sud-bih-dodik-potvrdjena-optuznica/32587843.html.
[xvi] Fella, “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
[xvii] “Sud BiH potvrdio optužnicu protiv Milorada Dodika.”
[xviii] “New Protests Were Held in Support of Dodik and Lukic,” Sarajevo Times, September 22, 2023, https://sarajevotimes.com/new-protests-were-held-in-support-of-dodik-and-lukic/.
[xix] Azem Kurtic, “Bosnia in 2025: New Year, New Political Crisis,” Balkan Insight (blog), January 2, 2025, https://balkaninsight.com/2025/01/02/bosnia-in-2025-new-year-new-political-crisis/.
[xx] Emina Muzaferija and Gerard Toal, “Rallying to Russia from the Balkans: Milorad Dodik and the Invasion of Ukraine,” PONARS Eurasia, June 5, 2023, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/rallying-to-russia-from-the-balkans-milorad-dodik-and-the-invasion-of-ukraine/.
[xxi] Azem Kurtic, “‘Serb Superhero’: Sanctions and Trials Help Bosnian Serb Leader Win Big at the Polls,” Balkan Insight (blog), October 18, 2024, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/10/18/serb-superhero-sanctions-and-trials-help-bosnian-serb-leader-win-big-at-the-polls/.
[xxii] Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost, and Baptiste Henry, “Little Substance, Considerable Impact: Russian Sources of Influence in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Clingendael Report (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ August 2023), https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2023/little-substance-considerable-impact/russian-sources-of-influence-in-serbia-montenegro-and-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[xxiii] “Aleksandar Vučić: Is Serbia Looking to the West or Russia and China?,” HARDTalk (BBC News, November 25, 2024), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct5t0k.
[xxiv] Florian Bieber, “Serbia’s Staged Balancing Act,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (blog), August 7, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/08/07/serbias-staged-balancing-act/.
[xxv] Alec Russell and Marton Dunai, “Serbia Turns Blind Eye to Its Ammunition Ending up in Ukraine,” Financial Times, June 22, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/136ed721-fd50-4815-8314-d9df8dc67fd6?accessToken=zwAGG8pmp93Ikc8Tbtch_VBIFdODFNnfjcZ_1g.MEQCIEZ0_R0KCl17gqovvni0sDaqCp3AlF-NZwmYp6JeqwV3AiB7XpWKfPsLKFvIGhrvJB_OesSArkhMF5GHmhRXlwbnZg&sharetype=gift&token=c3583534-f5ef-41a6-8ee0-40bbb88ea96e.
[xxvi] “Serbia’s New Government to Include US-Sanctioned Ex-Intelligence Chief with Close Ties to Russia | AP News,” Associated Press, April 30, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/serbia-government-us-sanctions-russia-eb7e3e620ce3f038dddd2dbf26f5396e.
[xxvii] “Critics Condemn Minister’s Call to Unite ‘Serb World,’” Al Jazeera, July 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/19/critics-condemn-ministers-call-to-unite-serbian.
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