The murder of Maulana Hamid-ul-Haq and Taliban-Pakistan divide

The murder of Maulana Hamid-ul-Haq, the chancellor of Madrasa Haqqania, in a suicide attack at the historic madrasa has once again exposed the intensity of the cancerous spread of South Asia’s jihadist ecosystem and its internal splits. Maulana Hamid-ul Haq was a member of the 12th National Assembly of Pakistan (2002-07) and then chief of Jamiat Ulema-ee Islam (Sami) since his father, Maulana Sami-ul Haq, was assassinated in 2018.

In South Asia, Hamid-ul-Haq’s murder is a critical development which has severe implications for the future of jihadist extremism in the region and beyond. Notably, Madrasa Haqqania finds the most respected place amongst the ‘Ivy League’ of Jihadism, including seminaries like Madrasah Binoria of Karachi. It has produced some of the most notorious terror masterminds, like Mullah Omar and Mullah Akhtar Mansour (both former Taliban chiefs); Haqqani Network’s Mujahiddin commanders, like Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Hizb-e-Islami chief Mohammad Yunus Khalis and Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam extremists like Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil, Azizur Rahman Hazarwi, Hamidul Haqqani, Taliban commanders like Zabiullah Mujahid, Amir Khan Muttaqi and the slain al-Qaeda-Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) chief, Asim Umar.

Maulana Hamid-ul-Haq’s murder reflects deep-rooted internecine tensions between the multitude of jihadist entities operating in the Af-Pak region. Though no organisation has formally owned up to the assassination, arguably, Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) comes out as the most probable actor perpetrating this attack.

Madrasa Haqqania adheres to the Deobandi school of Islam. Deobandi Islamic thought is followed by the Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a group of other terrorist organisations, popularly known as the Harkat Network. Madrasa Haqqania and its religious leadership, including prominent scholars like Sami-ul-Haq and Hamid-ul-Haq, are sacred to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.

On the other hand, ISKP believes in Wahhabi-Salafi ideology. Though both, i.e., Deobandis and Salafis, follow an extremist, orthodox, rigid, and exclusivist interpretation of Islamic scriptures, they are at loggerheads with each other. Hence, the Taliban following the Deobandi school is perceived as an arch-rival by the ISKP.

As a result, tensions and conflict dominate in the ideological sphere and the battlegrounds. Additionally, ISKP’s aggressive force posturing and violent attacks in the region are also an attempt to establish its robust foothold in the region, which, on account of its terrain, history, culture, jihadist ideology and material infrastructure, and easy availability of weapons, has historically been a haven for all kinds of terrorist entities.

Post-Taliban’s establishment of the second Islamic Emirate, ISKP has carried out some of the most brutal attacks in Afghanistan. The Taliban has left no stone unturned in ruthlessly suppressing and crushing ISKP. However, the ISKP continues to hold ground, gain strength and expand its strategic and ideological footprint. The rivalries between the traditional players in the region also facilitate its rise.

Afghan Taliban’s relations with Pakistan have gone sour with both sides staging attacks and engaging in border skirmishes. The Afghan Taliban is allegedly supporting the Baloch insurgents, which have become a significant security concern for Pakistan and its most ambitious geo-economic project of CPEC. At the same time, Islamabad’s adversary India is reaching out to the Afghan Taliban, a nightmare scenario for Pakistan as it fears that losing Afghanistan will deprive Pakistan of its strategic depth, leaving it vulnerable to a conventionally superior Indian military.

Also, TTP, operating from the Haqqani strongholds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), has revived. In its comeback avatar, TTP has emerged as an alarming security threat challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty and integrity. Reportedly, there are sizable clusters where Pakistan has lost control in KPK and Balochistan. Adding further to Pakistan’s worries is the growing proximity between the Afghan Taliban, TTP and Baloch Liberation Army.

In such a scenario, Pakistani agencies are most likely to use ISKP against its enemy, i.e., the Afghan Taliban and its ideological outposts and supporters. Haqqania is one such de facto outpost of the Taliban, more so its ideological and religious anchor. More recently, Khalil-ul-Rahman Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s uncle and a minister in the Taliban government, was killed by the ISKP.

In intelligence circles, theories abound that Pakistani intelligence ordered the hit job through ISKP because TTP is operating from Haqqani strongholds. Pakistan’s intelligence masterminds believe that the Haqqanis are sheltering and facilitating them. Even within the Taliban setup, internal frictions become more pronounced.

The Peshawar Taliban, dominated by Haqqanis, advocates more openness to the external world and flexibility on Islamic issues like female education. They have criticised the Kandahar Taliban led by Haibatullah Akhundzada for their regressive and orthodox policies on female education.

Reportedly, Pakistan supports Akhundzada’s orthodox, extremist, and rigid approach on religious matters because Islamabad does not see the Taliban’s opening-up as congenial to Pakistan’s vital national interests.

In February 2025, Akhundzada ordered his loyalist Taliban commanders to march to the North and take possession of the Kabul airport and some strategically sensitive fortresses. Analysed against the backdrop discussed above, it is quite likely that the ISI is the real actor behind the assassination of Hamid-ul-Haq. Most probably, the ISI used ISKP to neutralise Hamid-ul-Haq. Incidentally, Hamid-ul-Haq recently criticised the Pakistan army. After his death, his son has vowed to make Pakistan an Islamic nation, much to the chagrin of the Pakistan Army.

In the past also, Deobandi terrorist outfits have been at loggerheads with the Pakistani state on several occasions. Deobandi terrorists holed up in Lal Masjid of Lahore, resulting in a massive military operation (2007) to neutralise the terrorists. However, the Salafi-Wahhabi terror groups have never betrayed the Pakistan army and the intelligence. The best example is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has remained steadfastly loyal to the Pakistan Army.

On the other hand, Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar, a Deobandi cleric, fell out of favour with Musharraf after he revolted against Pakistan for joining the US-led Global War on Terror. Allegedly, he even conspired to assassinate Musharraf.

Notably, Salafi groups like the LeT are more loyal to Pakistan because they lack sufficient political, social, and economic clout to take an independent stand and refuse to be a pawn in Pakistani intelligence’s strategic games. On the other hand, Deobandis have a much more powerful and historic social base, including hundreds of madrasas and Darul-Uloom seminaries which ensure an uninterrupted supply of funds from donations.

Hence, it is reasonable to argue that Pakistan is using ISKP to signal its enemies like the Taliban, TTP, and Haqqanis and neutralise them when required. Also, it needs to be noted that Pakistan’s ties with ISKP are deep-rooted. ISKP’s former slain chief Farooqi served as a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist.

Having discussed the complexities of Af-Pak’s jihadist landscape, it can be argued that undoubtedly the region has become a most fertile breeding ground for terrorists. A range of terrorist actors are operating in the region, each competing with the other one in extremism, exclusivism, and hatred. As a result, internal splits have surfaced between them. However, in the longer run, the cancerous spread of religious extremism and radicalisation will benefit from the burgeoning and strengthening Jihadist ecosystem of the region.

To conclude, it can be stated that the Pakistan Army is more likely to use ISKP to neutralise its opponents in the future.

The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen’s College, Delhi and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.